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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
given to Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School Association,
wherein the Court of Appeals was confronted with a time-bar
challenge to a demand for arbitration. The Paver Court held that
arbitration will be time barred only when on no view of the facts
could the claim withstand such a challenge had it been an action at
law.
Another significant case discussed in The Survey is Basso v.
Miller, wherein the Court of Appeals abandoned use of the com-
mon law distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and invitees in
determining the duty owed by a landowner to an injured party.
Instead, the Court adopted a single duty of reasonable care under
the circumstances of each case.
Other cases of significant import discussed in this issue of The
Survey include Seligson v. Chase Manhattan Bank, wherein the Appel-
late Division, First Department, extended the statute of limitations
tolling provisions of CPLR 203(c) to cross-claims. In Menefee v.
Floyd & Beasley Transportation Co., the Supreme Court, Nassau
County, permitted a Seider attachment to stand although several of
the plaintiffs were not New York residents. Also discussed is O'Sul-
livan v. State, wherein the Court of Claims held that the 6-month
notice requirement of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act applies
to apportionment claims brought pursuant to Dole v. Dow Chemical
Corp., and that an apportionment action against the state accrues
on the date of judgment. Unfortunately, because of limitations of
space, many- other significant cases could not be discussed. It is
hoped, however, that the present installment of The Survey offers
the practitioner a valuable guide to New York procedure.
ARTICLE 2- LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 203(a): Continuous treatment doctrine applied to liability insurer's
refusal to defend.
CPLR 203(a) provides that the period within which an action
must be commenced is to be computed from the time the cause of
action accrues.' In actions for breach of contract it is generally held
that the cause of action accrues, and thus the statute of limitations
begins to run, at the time of initial breach.2 In order to mitigate the
I CPLR 203(a) provides that "[tjhe time within which an action must be commenced,
except as otherwise expressly prescribed, shall be computed from the time the cause of
action accrued to the time the claim is interposed."
2 It is the breach itself that gives rise to the cause of action. Thus, the statute of
limitations begins to run regardless of whether plaintiff had knowledge of the breach or
whether damages have accrued. See, e.g., French Evangelical Church v. Borst, 22 App. Div.
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harsh consequences of this rule in cases involving an undiscovered
breach, 3 courts have developed various ameliorative doctrines.
4
One such device is the doctrine of continuous treatment. Usually
employed in the area of malpractice, this doctrine provides that
when a professional renders continuing services related to the same
problem or complaint, the statute of limitations 5 for a particular act
of negligence committed in the course of these professional ac-
tivities will be tolled until termination of the services.
6
In Colpan Realty Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co., 7 the
Supreme Court, Westchester County, applied the continuous
treatment doctrine to an insurance company's breach of a covenant
to defend. Colpan had been sued for intentional property damage
in 1966. Judgment was rendered against it in 1968, and final
2d 511, 256 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1st Dep't 1965); Varga v. Credit-Suisse, 5 App. Div. 2d 289, 171
N.Y.S.2d 674 (lst Dep't), aff'd mem., 5 N.Y.2d 865, 155 N.E.2d 865, 182 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1958);
Edlux Constr. Corp. v. State, 252 App. Div. 373, 300 N.Y.S. 509 (3d Dep't 1937), aff'd mem.,
277 N.Y. 635, 14 N.E.2d 197 (1938); 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1339A (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1968).
3 The running of the statute of limitations will preclude access to the courts by a
potential plaintiff who does not discover that he has been injured until after the limitation
period has run. See 1 WK&M 213.10.
'See, e.g., Ryan Ready Mixed Concrete Corp. v. Coons, 25 App. Div. 2d 530, 267
N.Y.S.2d 627 (2d Dep't 1966) (mem.) (cause of action for failure to obtain effective liability
insurance accrued when insurer disclaimed liability rather than at breach), criticized in 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 203, commentary at 112-14 (1972); Lewis v. Lewis, 59 Misc. 2d 525, 299
N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969) (cause of action accrued at occurrence of
harm rather than at breach in action for cancellation of insurance policy in violation of
separation agreement), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 313, 315
(1969).
Although the statute of limitations for medical malpractice is 2 years, CPLR 214-a,
and the period for other categories of malpractice is 3 years, CPLR 214(6), contract actions
are governed by a 6-year limitation. CPLR 213(2). In an effort to invoke this longer period
in causes of action based upon professional treatment, litigants will frequently allege breach
of contract rather than plead the action in tort. Courts, however, normally apply the shorter
malpractice statute of limitations unless the action is based on breach of a contract imposing
a greater duty than the implied contractual obligation to use due care. The 6-year contract
statute of limitations is most often used when the professional had undertaken to achieve a
specific result. See 1 WK&M 214.20, 214-a.07. Compare Carr v. Lipshie, 8 App. Div. 2d
330, 187 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1st Dep't 1959) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 9 N.Y.2d 983, 176 N.E.2d
512, 218 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1961) (three-year malpractice statute applies in action for breach of
promise to perform accounting services), with Di Pietro v. Hecker, 43 Misc. 2d 630, 251
N.Y.S.2d 704 (Westchester County Ct. 1964) (six-year contract statute of limitations applica-
ble in action against attorney alleging failure to obtain a specific result).
6 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962)
(medical malpractice). The doctrine of continuous treatment in the area of medical malprac-
tice is codified in CPLR 214-a. Moreover, the doctrine has been judicially extended to actions
for malpractice in other professions. See Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d
831 (2d Dep't 1968) (law); Stern v. Hausberg, 22 App. Div. 2d 669, 253 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1st
Dep't 1964) (per curiam) (dentistry); County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc.
2d 889, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1974) (architecture), discussed in The
Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 792, 794 (1975); Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 74 Misc. 2d
1025, 347 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1973) (public accounting).
' 83 Misc. 2d 730, 373 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Count), 1975).
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appeal therefrom was dismissed in 1972.8 Despite repeated re-
quests by Colpan, its insurer, Great American, refused to provide
legal representation, contending that the claim was not covered by
its policy.9 When the insurance company was subsequently held
liable for the entire judgment, 0 Colpan brought the instant action
to recover attorney's fees incurred in the earlier suit."
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the 6-year statute of limitations period for breach of contract 12 had
expired, contending that the cause of action for attorneys' fees had
accrued either when it had originally refused to defend the action
in 1966, or when the defense was terminated by judgment in 1968.
The court, however, reasoned that the liability insurer was in effect
an "institutionalized substitute" for an attorney. 3 The obligation to
8 McGroarty v. Colpan Realty Corp., 159 N.Y.L.J. 53, Mar. 18, 1968, at 25, col. 5 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County), appeal dismissed, 167 N.Y.L.J. 15, Jan. 21, 1972, at 17, col. 5 (2d
Dep't Jan. 19, 1972).
9 Colpan was insured only against accidental damage. Although the original complaint
alleged intentional property damage, it was thereafter amended to include allegations of
negligence. See note 10 infra.
10 McGroarty v. Great American Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 329 N.E.2d 172, 368 N.Y.S.2d
485 (1975), affg 43 App. Div. 2d 368, 351 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2d Dep't 1974). McGroarty had
won a judgment against Colpan and thereafter brought an action against Great American
pursuant to N.Y. INS. LAiW § 167(1)(b) (McKinney 1966). This statute requires that all
liability insurance policies issued or delivered in the State contain a provision permitting a
judgment creditor to maintain an action against the insurer in the event that a judgment
against the insured remains unsatisfied more than 30 days after service of notice. Id.
Great American argued that the intentional damage alleged by McGroarty in the
original complaint was not within the coverage of its policy, and thus it properly had
disclaimed liability. Moreover, although the complaint was amended to include allegations
sounding in negligence, the insurer was not informed of the change until several months
after the trial. 43 App. Div. 2d at 371, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 431. The Appellate Division, Second
Department, reversed the trial court's judgment for Great American, finding that the
property damage was an "unintended and fortuitous" result of Colpan's intentional acts, and
therefore an accidental injury within the coverage of the insurance policy. Id. at 374, 351
N.Y.S.2d at 434. The broad duty to defend under a liability insurance policy extends to all
actions in which the complaint alleges facts which, if proved, would render the insurer liable.
Id. at 378, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 438; accord, Prashker v. United States Guar. Co., I N.Y.2d 584,
592, 136 N.E.2d 871, 875, 154 N.Y.S.2d 910, 916 (1956). In this case, although the original
complaint did not expressly allege negligence, it stated facts which provided Great American
with notice that an aspect of the action was within the policy coverage, thereby invoking the
duty to defend. 43 App. Div. 2d at 378-79, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
"1 83 Misc. 2d at 730, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
12 CPLR 213(2).
1 83 Misc. 2d at 732, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 804. Such reasoning serves to legitimize the
adoption of the continuous treatment doctrine in this case by incorporating into the
insured-insurer relationship the same quality of reliance which is a major consideration in
justifying tolling of the statute during the course of a professional relationship. The court
found support for this analogy in Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1st Dep't 1965), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 122, 154 (1965),
wherein the Appellate Division, First Department, indicated that automobile liability insur-
ance, because it is litigation insurance, is an "institutionalized substitute" for the attorney-
client relationship. Thus, the Kandel court held that in appropriate situations communica-
tions between insurer and insured are entitled to protection from discovery as a type of work
product in preparation of litigation. 22 App. Div. 2d at 517-18, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 902. Such
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provide legal representation, according to the court, continued
until the action met with final disposition, "for until such event
defendant could have assuaged plaintiff's grief, sealed the breach
and redeemed its wrong by taking up the cudgels of the action."14
The court ruled, therefore, that the action accrued when the
breach was completed by final dismissal of the appeal, thus invok-
ing the continuous treatment doctrine to toll the statute of lim-
itations until termination of the course of wrongful conduct. Since,
under the Colpan reasoning, the 6-year limitation period did not
begin to run until the final appeal was dismissed in 1972, the
plaintiff's action was not time barred. 15
In applying the continuous treatment doctrine to the insurer's
wrongful refusal to defend, the court has used a tolling device,
heretofore primarily utilized in malpractice cases, in an action for
breach of a contract not based upon a professional-client relation-
ship. The doctrine has been justified in malpractice actions as a
means of protecting patients and clients who have a right to rely
upon professional judgment during a continuing course of treat-
issues are not reached, however, when the insurer immediately disclaims responsibility for
the conduct of the litigation. Under such circumstances "litigation insurance" has failed of its
purpose and should not be considered a substitute for the attorney-client relationship. Cf.
Rautine v. Preston, 84 Misc. 2d 156, 374 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. Chemung County 1975) (no
confidential relationship between insurer and insured recognized).
'4 83 Misc. 2d at 732, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 804. The Colpan court appears to suggest that
because the obligation to afford representation continued, the breach was not complete until
final dismissal of the action, and the cause of action did not accrue until that time. It is clear,
however, that an action for breach of contract accrues at the moment of breach. See 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 203, commentary at 113 (1972), citing 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1001
(1964). In Colpan, the breach occurred when defendant refused to represent plaintiff in the
initial action.
Application of the continuous treatment doctrine to contract actions would not require a
finding that the cause of action accrues only when the breach becomes final. The doctrine
does not affect substantive principles regarding accrual of actions, despite the tendency of
courts to express the consequences of its use as delaying accrual until the termination of
treatment or representation. Rather, it tolls the running of the statute. See 31 FORDHAM L.
REV. 842, 844-45 (1963), discussing Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d
777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962). For a discussion of the specific consequences of an unjustified
refusal to defend, see 14 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 51:52 to :73 (2d ed.
R. Anderson 1965).
Is 83 Misc. 2d at 732, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 804-05. The court offered an alternative rationale
for dismissing the limitations defense, viewing each refusal to defend the action as a
continuing breach of the insurance contract. According to this theory, the refusals became
final and the "breach" occurred when the appeal was ultimately terminated by dismissal;
thus, an action instituted within 6 years of the dismissal was timely. Id. at 372-73, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 805. This reasoning, however, appears to lack merit. If each refusal to provide
legal representation is viewed as a new breach of contract, only those breaches occurring
within the 6-year limitation period would be actionable. Cf. General Precision, Inc. v.
Ametek, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 898, 232 N.E.2d 862, 285 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1967) (mem.) (only those
breaches within 6 years actionable where contract was continually breached over an 8-year
period).
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ment or representation.1 6 In a relationship based upon trust and
confidence, it is manifestly unfair that the patient or client should
be forced to choose between immediate inquiry into the effective-
ness of the measures taken by the professional, with the concomi-
tant disruption of the relationship, and the risk of being lulled
"into sleeping on his rights."1 The same policy considerations,
6 See note 17 infra. The doctrine has not met with universal approval, however, for it is
a half measure, one of the devices used in the law of time limitations to mitigate some of its
more inequitable results. Although commentators have recommended a statute of limitations
running from the discovery of the malpractice, see N.Y. LAw REvISION COMM'N, REPORT,
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65(c), at 6, 15, 38 (1962), and the Law Revision Commission has
proposed legislation to similar effect, id. at 3-7, the proposal was not enacted; instead, the
general malpractice limitations period was lengthened from 2 to 3 years. Ch. 308, § 214,
[1962) N.Y. Laws 1310 (codified at CPLR 214). Actions for medical malpractice now must be
commenced within a period of 2V years. CPLR 214-a; see 1 WK&M 214.21. In view of the
apparent legislative hostility toward the postponement of accrual of a cause of action until
discovery, the Court of Appeals, in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d
212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963), weighed the policy
considerations involved:
Considering the function of the Statute of Limitations as a device for repose, a
potential defendant's equities are the same whether the plaintiff knows of his
condition or not. Repose is as beneficial to society in the one case as in the other.
While the plaintiff's equities are greater in one case, it was presumably pursuant to
a determination that the interests of an occasional claimant were subordinate to
society's interest in repose that resulted in the Statute of Limitations in the first
place .... [P]erhaps ... society is best served by complete repose after a certain
number of years even at the sacrifice of a few unfortunate cases. Whatever the
policy considerations, the recent amendment of the malpractice statute from two to
three years makes it clear that the legislative choice was deliberately made in the
face of strenuously advocated alternatives.
Id. at 218-19, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19 (citations omitted).
Another tolling device is the foreign object doctrine, whereby accrual of the cause of
action is postponed until the injured party discovers or should have discovered the injury.
Thus, when a physician negligently leaves a foreign object in a patient's body, the statute of
limitations is tolled until the patient could reasonably have discovered the malpractice. See
Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23
(1969) (surgical clamps left in patient's abdomen). The courts have been reluctant, however,
to extend such a discovery rule to other professions. See, e.g., Gilbert Properties, Inc. v.
Millstein, 40 App. Div. 2d 100, 338 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1st Dep't 1972), aff'd men., 33 N.Y.2d 857,
307 N.E.2d 257, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973).
Legislative opposition to accrual upon discovery is evidenced by section 214-a of the
CPLR. That section, which shortened the period of limitation for medical malpractice from
3 to 22 years, expressly excluded from the foreign object doctrine any "chemical compound,
fixation device or prosthetic aid or device," and excepted from the continuous treatment
doctrine "examinations undertaken for the sole purpose of ascertaining the state of the
patient's condition." CPLR 214-a. Thus it appears that "there is no likelihood that a rule
similar to the Law Revision Commission's 1962 recommendation will be adopted in the near
future." I WK&M 214.21, at 2-314.
17 N.Y. LAW REvisioN COMM'N, REPORT, N.Y. LFG. Doc. No. 65(c), at 38 (1962). The
grounds upon which the continuous treatment doctrine is justified are applicable to all
professional-client relationships. Every professional relationship is one of trust in which the
client depends exclusively on the professional's judgment. Upon the commission of a negli-
gent act, it is unjust to require a client to choose between instituting a suit and allowing the
professional to undertake corrective efforts. Moreover, a different rule would encourage
professionals to prolong a course of treatment or representation, corrective or otherwise,
until the expiration of the statutory period in order to insulate themselves from suit. See 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 214, commentary at 38 (Supp. 1975).
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however, do not apply in the absence of a professional relation-
ship. 18 Moreover, in a case such as Colpan, wherein the insurer
denied responsibility for the conduct of the litigation from the
outset, the concept of reliance upon a continuing course of rep-
resentation is misplaced. 19 No injustice is done by requiring that
the insured assert his claim within 6 years of the purported breach.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Colpan court's application of
the continuous treatment doctrine to an insurance company's cov-
enant to defend is an erroneous extension of the doctrine. The
decision burdens insurers with substantially extended potential lia-
bility, and yet is not supported by the policy considerations which
justify application of the doctrine of continuous treatment in mal-
practice actions.
CPLR 203(c): Tolling provisions for defenses and counterclaims extended
to cross-claims.
CPLR 203(c) permits the interposition of a defense or coun-
terclaim even though such defense or counterclaim would be
barred by the applicable statute of limitations were it to be prose-
cuted as an independent cause of action. 20 This provision codifies
the doctrine of relation back, whereby any time-barred defense or
counterclaim is maintainable so long as it is not time barred when
the plaintiff commences his cause of action. 21 Moreover, even if the
18 See note 17 supra. One recent case has extended the continuous treatment exception
to actions in contract against an attorney. Grago v. Robertson, 49 App. Div. 2d 645, 370
N.Y.S.2d 255 (3d Dep't 1975) (mem.) (cause of action accrued at termination of representa-
tion in action for breach of contractual obligation to preserve legal interests). Since the
justification for the doctrine is based upon the nature of the professional relationship, it is
appropriate to apply it to all wrongs committed within the framework of that relationship,
whether the allegations sound in tort or contract.
19 See note 13 supra.
20 CPLR 203(c) provides:
A defense or counterclaim is interposed when a pleading containing it is served. A
defense or counterclaim is not barred if it was not barred at the time the claims
asserted in the complaint were interposed, except that if the defense or coun-
terclaim arose from the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or oc-
currences, upon which a claim asserted in the complaint depends, it is not barred to
the extent of the demand in the complaint notwithstanding that it was barred at the
time the claims asserted in the complaint were interposed.
21 Under the CPA, the statute of limitations on a counterclaim continued to run until
service of the answer containing the counterclaim. See CPA § 11. Plaintiffs who feared
counterclaims based on the same occurrence were encouraged to delay commencement of a
lawsuit until it would be difficult or impossible for the defendant to timely interpose his
counterclaim. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 203(c), commentary at 119 (1972). The doctrine of
relation back, as codified in the CPLR, has been readily accepted and applied by the courts.
See, e.g., Styles v. Gibson, 27 App. Div. 2d 784, 277 N.Y.S.2d 245 (3d Dep't 1967); Ornter v.
Booth, 21 App. Div. 2d 663, 249 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1st Dep't 1964); Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram,
170 N.Y.L.J. 1, July 2, 1973, at 2, col. 1 (App. T. 1st Dep't).
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